Volume seven of the first Cambridge ancient history, dedicated to the centuries after Alexander (1928), has on its cover an image of the Roman she-wolf. Thus there can be no doubt that this was the period of the rise of Rome and the decline of Greek civilization. The predominant view of the age by historians of the early twentieth century is outlined in an introductory essay by W.S. Ferguson. [1] Section IV on “The large state and the polis” is a lengthy complaint about the demise of “the polis ideal,” which was seemingly on the wane even before Chaironeia due to the rise of political and economical elites and royalist oligarchies. The single most important cause of the decline, however, was the loss of political autonomy after Chaironeia: “The fatal weakness of the Greek city-states as the custodian of civilization was their incapacity to form an all-embracing coalition” (p.22); as a result, they were “completely shorn of their statehood, [lacking] municipal rights and a voice in the affairs of the realm of which they formed part” (24-25).

It seems obvious to the author that there are interesting parallels between Curtius' narrative of the conspiracy of Bessus against Darius, and especially of Patron's role in this affair, and the Philotas affair, the most famous conspiracy, and subsequent political
trial, which took place during Alexander's expedition. In the former conspiracy Darius did not believe the informer who revealed the conspiracy among his staff, and, as a consequence, he lost his life. In the latter case Philotas did not inform the king about a conspiracy he had heard of, and Alexander only escaped danger thanks to knowledge about it which he received from another informer. The failure of Philotas to inform the king of the plot may partly be explained by his father's previous false warning of a plot by Philip the Acarnanian to poison Alexander. These parallels have so far been rather overlooked in Alexander scholarship, and the purpose of this article is to examine them. These resemblances furthermore re-open the question of which sources were available to Curtius, when reporting the last weeks of Darius III, and it is to this question we first turn.

Quintus Curtius Rufus' narrative of the last weeks of Darius III is believed to be untrustworthy in many respects. Some of the
events leading to Bessus' coup d’ état are held to be no more than literary fiction. For example the meeting of the Persian commanders at Ecbatana is considered to be one of the least plausible episodes. Modern commentator, however, make a favorable exception for the role of Patron the Phocian [1], a mercenary commander who revealed the conspiracy of Bessus and Nabarzanes to Darius, and who is sometimes supposed to be one of the authors responsible for the picture of Alexander's campaign we get from the Persian camp, one of the persons behind the so-called mercenaries’ source. It would be only reasonable to assume that Patron the Phocian plays a key role in Curtius' account because his report formed the key source utilized by that author.

In the past 35 years our archaeological and epigraphic evidence for the history and culture of ancient Macedon has been transformed. This book brings together the leading Greek archaeologists and historians of the area in a major collaborative survey of the finds and their interpretation, many of them unpublished outside Greece. The recent, immensely significant excavations of the palace of King Philip II are published here for the first time. Major new chapters on the Macedonians' Greek language, civic life, fourth and third century BC kings and court accompany specialist surveys of the region's art and coinage and the royal palace centres of Pella and Vergina, presented here with much new evidence. This book is the essential companion to Macedon, packed with new information and bibliography which no student of the Greek world can now afford to neglect.

THE ORGANISATION of the Macedonian army under Alexander the Great, names and functions of units, effective numbers of warriors included, are fiercely debated.[1] That Alexander’s war against Persia occupies the central place in ancient military accounts has not helped scholars reach a degree of consensus. This study likewise departs from the existing reconstructions. It shares with its predecessors a belief that the Companion and Foot Companion units of the Macedonian army were arranged by geographical or tribal origin. I am unable, however, to accept discrepancies between the numbers of cavalry and infantry units suggested by previous studies, and I prefer to look for the regular and logically explicable division of this army, similar to mathematical regularity, with which known armies of Greek poleis, and especially those of federal states, were organised.

This study represents, therefore, an attempt to view Macedonia of the last Argead kings from the perspective of a historian interested in the growth of federalism in the Greek world in the fourth century B.C. This approach should not be surprising. Recently, scholars dealing with Hellenistic Macedonia have tended to stress extensive similarities between the kingdom and the Greek federal states of the period. Of course,various scholars underscore different arguments—the existence of well-organised poleis in fourth-century Macedonia (which strengthens the resemblance between the Macedonian monarchy and Greek confederacies),[2] or the fact that ancient authors list Macedonia together with Greek federal states as members of symmachies. It has been suggested that at least in the Hellenistic age Macedonia’s rulers believed that “Macedonia should not look old-fashioned in a new period of federative boom.” [3]

Preview:

Until recently, Achaemenid historiography did not show much interest in the reign of Darius III, or in the state of the empire at the time Alexander set foot in Asia Minor. It sufficed to explain everything by the convenient thesis of the "colossus with feet of clay" that had become irreversibly undermined by disorganization, overtaxation, and rebellious subjects. This thesis was, in itself, deemed sufficient to explain the Persian defeat in confrontations with the Macedonian armies. From its origins, Alexander historiography has developed two visions of the Persian adversary. One is found in handbooks and the most recent conference proceedings: that the Achaemenid empire is evanescent to such a degree that it does not even represent one of two players in the game about to be played on the Near Eastern chessboard: time passes "as if Alexander were alone...when he faced his personal quest." In contrast, other historians have attempted to reevaluate the military strategic capacities of the last Great King.

This double orientation in modern historiography is, to some extent, the latest avatar of a double-sided image of Darius handed down by the Greco-Roman tradition and continuously running through modern European historiography: Darius is either portrayed as a despot characterized by weakness and lack of drive, a man incapable of facing the danger that the Macedonian invasion presented to his throne and his empire; or he is glorified as a king possessing virtues and all kinds of admirable qualities, yet confronted by an enemy of such overwhelming strength that he stood no chance of gaining victory over him. This second image, of a man both capable and courageous but overcome by a peerless adversary (presented by Bossuetas early as 1681), was adopted by Droysen from 1833 on, and the same conclusion is reached by a recent study by Badian (2000b: 265)

Read the entire paper on Academia.edu
(c) Pierre Briant: Collège de France, Chaire d'histoire et civilisation du monde achéménide et de l'empire d'Alexandre and Emeritus

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During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries historians and scholars collected the heritage of Classical antiquity, a corpus in which, traditionally, Greek vigor and Macedonian strength were contrasted with the weakness of the Persian empire. The latter was usually defined by its state of political and territorial disorganization, by its corrupting luxury, and by its irreversible military inferiority, in short by, to use the traditional expression, “Achaemenid decadence.” According to a tenacious stereotype, which can be traced back to Greek authors, this empire was wealthy and weak at the same time.(8) It suffices to examine a single example, the Histoire ancienne by Charles Rollin, which was published from 1730 onward to exceptional acclaim in all European states. Influenced by Bossuet (1681), Rollin developed a catastrophic view of the Persian enemy and its continuous decline from Xerxes to Darius III. Based on the same pedagogical and political presuppositions (the values to be impressed upon a prince), Rollin condemned Alexander’s excesses, which he saw corrupted by Asian luxuries:(9) “In imitation of the Persian kings he turned his palace into a seraglio, filling it with three hundred and sixty concubines (the same number Darius kept) and with bands of eunuchs, of all mankind the most infamous” (Rollin 1791: 168)

Read the entire paper on Academia.edu
(c) Pierre Briant: Collège de France, Chaire d'histoire et civilisation du monde achéménide et de l'empire d'Alexandre and Emeritus

Early relations between Macedonia and the Aetolian Confederacy, unlike their contacts in the Hellenistic Age, have not been often subjected to historical investigation. Inspite — or rather because — of this relative shortage of modern studies historical constructs do not agree in details. Historians dealing with a rapid growth of Macedonia during the reign of Philip II admit that Aetolia belonged to his closest allies even in the last years of the king’s reign. This friendly attitude is commonly believed to find proof in transferring Naupactus from the Achaean Confederacy to the Aetolians with help from Philip II after the battle of Chaeronea. This consensus [2], however, was disturbed by an unconventional historical reconstruction presented by A. B. Bosworth [3]. The sequence of events as presented by Bosworth was not unquestionably accepted, but still demands discussion since the person behind it is undoubtedly counted among the most influential recent historians of Alexander the Great [4].

The so-called Donations of Alexandria, a Ptolemaic royal ritual in 34 BCE, is an important but puzzling landmark in the development of the Roman Near East. At this theatrical, public ceremony, of which relatively detailed accounts survive in Plutarch’s biography of Antonius and Dio Cassius’ Roman History, [1] the triumvir Marcus Antonius solemnly promised to Kleopatra VII Philopator and her infant children rulership over the east “from the Hellespont to India”, a domain that was largely identical with the empires of both the Ptolemies and Seleukids at their greatest extent.

The celebrations lasted several days. The key ceremony took place in the gymnasion, the usual location for coronations in Alexandria. Like actors on a stage, Antonius and Kleopatra and her four children - three of whom were also Antonius’ children -  
performed on an elevated dais before the royal household, the royal guard and members of the Alexandrian citizenry. Kleopatra and her eldest son Ptolemaios XV Caesar (‘Caesarion’), with whom she shared the Ptolemaic kingship, were proclaimed Queen of Kings and King of Kings of the enormous empire outlined above. Antonius’ children by Kleopatra - Alexandros Helios, Kleopatra Selene, Ptolemaios Philadelphos - received lesser, albeit still magnificent royal titles. Kleopatra was dressed as Isis, Antonius presumably as Dionysos; Alexandros Helios wore the attire of an Iranian king, and Ptolemaios Philopator the generic royal dress of a Hellenistic king. The only participant, who was not awarded royal honours, was Antonius, the Roman.

Greek authors talking about actions by a popular assembly of Greek polis regularly use the term ekklesia while referring to this institution. This noun is often applied to the assemblies in the states in which other designations for this institution had the official character. Ekklesia became, therefore, thanks to Athenian model mainly, a generic term for "the Greek popular assembly". Today historians, however, are fully aware that at Athens ekklesia had demos as a synonym [1], so in documentary evidence as in literary works. Ancient authors sometimes retain the wording of decrees they quote, but translating the documentary style of decrees into a language comprehensible to a broader circle of readers is more common. The question how ancient Greek authors rendered state’s working, decree-passing procedures and names of acting assemblies was analysed for the polis-states, yet other forms of political organisation in Greece there is no specific study [2].

The most notable exception is the Macedonian assembly that is also the most important scholarly problem among the better researched non-polis, assemblies. This privileged situation of the Macedonian assembly does surprise, since it is the central problem in the discussion on the constitutional (or non-constitutional) character of the Macedonian monarchy [3].   

One hundred eighty-three words, nearly a full page of the manuscript, portray Philip on three campaigns: against Methoni, against Byzantium, and, amidst a description of his talents and character, against Athens. Though this text resurfaced briefly, and obscurely, in 1838, its importance for Philip and for Byzantine scholarship has never been examined. Brad L. Cook describes the contents of the Philip epitome, translates it and compares it to ancient tradition.